North Korea has recently taken a series of
provocative steps to challenge the international community. These steps include
test-launching a long-range rocket, walking away from the six-party talks and
all disarmament agreements, kicking out international inspectors from its
nuclear facilities, conducting an underground nuclear test May 25-a more
powerful blast than the one conducted in 2006-testing a half-dozen short-range
missiles, and announcing it had resumed plutonium production and started a
program to enrich uranium. Pyongyang reportedly also is preparing a long-range
missile test and a third nuclear test. If unchecked, North Korea will surely
increase the quantity and quality of its arsenal. Even worse, once Pyongyang
has more than enough weapons for its deterrent, it might be tempted to sell the
surplus. The longer the crisis lasts, the more nuclear capable North Korea will
become and the more difficult it will be to roll back Pyongyang's nuclear
ambitions.
China, North Korea's most important ally
and trade partner, has joined the rest of the international community in
responding to the North Korean actions. Beijing has indicated, however, that it
wants a balanced approach and does not want to push Pyongyang much harder.
Nevertheless, China can and should do more to press its neighbor. North Korea's
recent series of actions threatens China's national interests as well as those
of the United States and countries in Northeast Asia.
It is important to have realistic
expectations for changes in China's approach. Beijing can be expected to
support modest UN sanctions against North Korea, as it did in response to the
first nuclear test, but it probably will respond less strongly than the United
States, Japan, and South Korea would hope. Beijing probably will maintain that
any harsh measures should be directed toward facilitating talks over
denuclearization but should not destabilize the North Korean regime.
On the other hand, Beijing must recognize
that its modest approach, as the past several years have demonstrated, has not
successfully constrained Pyongyang's nuclear development. Pyongyang proceeded
with its two nuclear tests and has again boycotted the six-party talks. The May
test has exacerbated the tense situation on the Korean peninsula and has
destroyed regional stability. These results do not serve Beijing's major
interest: a nuclear-free and stable Korean peninsula. If Beijing continues to
allow Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions to go unchecked, Pyongyang will put Beijing
in an embarrassing position, open it to more international pressure, and
ultimately pose great risks to China's national interests.
China's
Interests
Hours after North Korea's most recent
nuclear test, the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement strongly
denouncing it:
On 25 May 2009, the DPRK [Democratic
People's Republic of Korea] conducted another nuclear test in disregard for the
common opposition of the international community. The Chinese Government is
firmly opposed to this act.... To bring about denuclearization of the Korean
peninsula, oppose nuclear proliferation and safeguard peace and stability in
Northeast Asia is the firm and consistent stand of the Chinese Government.
China strongly urges the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization, stop
relevant moves that may further worsen the situation and return to the
Six-Party Talks.
Beijing issued a similar statement in
response to Pyongyang's first nuclear test in 2006, condemning the blast as
brazen. China's response this time was even stronger. According to media
reports, Beijing was informed by Pyongyang less than half an hour in advance of
the explosion and was greatly angered and offended by the test because it
blatantly disregarded China's calls for denuclearization. Even cautious
high-level Chinese officials, including Vice President Xi Jinping and Minister
of National Defense Liang Guanglie, have made harsh statements in opposition to
Pyongyang's nuclear test. Moreover, Beijing has reportedly canceled some
previously scheduled high-level visits to Pyongyang.
China's strategic plan through 2020 is
focused on economic development and "building a well-off society in an
all-round way," which requires a stable international environment,
particularly among neighboring countries. A nuclear North Korea would stimulate
a regional nuclear arms race and undermine regional stability. North Korea's
nuclear and missile development provides a pretext for Japan to accelerate
deployment of a joint U.S.-Japanese missile defense shield, which could
mitigate China's nuclear deterrent. Moreover, a worsening crisis would generate
a massive flow of North Korean refugees headed for China.
To bolster its image as a responsible
stakeholder in the international community, China should show its willingness
to contribute to international nonproliferation efforts. Accepting a nuclear
North Korea would set a bad precedent both for the nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) regime-from which North Korea has withdrawn-and other countries
with nuclear ambitions.
North Korea has long been a thorn in
China's side. Pyongyang played a game of brinkmanship between Beijing and
Moscow for several decades during the Cold War. Further nuclear and missile
development would add a dangerous new element, allowing North Korea's strategic
nuclear-strike capability to cover all of China. Thus, China, in the long term
if not the near term, faces huge risks from a nuclear North Korea.
Beijing's
Leverage
Among the interested players in the North
Korean nuclear issue, China has the most significant economic and political
leverage over the North Korean regime. China has been a close ally of North
Korea over the past 50 years, with a friendship cemented in blood during the
Korean War. Also, China is North Korea's largest trading partner, reportedly
supplying North Korea with up to 90 percent of its oil imports and about 45
percent of its subsistence-level food supplies. Moreover, cross-border trade in
2008 was reportedly about $2.7 billion, an increase of about 40 percent from
2007.
Since April 2003, China has hosted one
trilateral negotiation and six rounds of the six-party talks. During these
negotiations, China has acted not only as a host, but also as a mediator and
constructive participant. China's major role in negotiations, as former Vice
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the head of the Chinese delegation to the first three
rounds of the six-party talks, emphasized, "is contributing to peace and
talks" (quan he cu tan). China, according to official statements, hopes
the parties to the talks will take actions to build trust, reduce suspicions,
enhance consensus, and promote cooperation in order to create a win-win
situation.
In particular, China's role became even
more proactive in the fourth round of the talks, leading to the breakthrough
agreement on a joint statement of principles. During the fourth round, China
not only tabled five drafts of the joint statement but also took a
"reject/accept" approach to push the United States to accept the
joint statement. Beijing also reportedly has lured Pyongyang to each round of
the six-party talks with tens of millions of dollars in incentives. U.S.
officials have praised China's active role in the talks, saying it has helped
U.S.-Chinese relations.
Although Beijing is shifting from its
traditional low-profile role in the affairs of the Korean peninsula toward a
more active and constructive role in defusing the nuclear crisis, Beijing's
leverage on Pyongyang is constrained by two main factors. First, Beijing believes
the nuclear crisis is mainly the business of Washington and Pyongyang and, as
such, is dependent on the political will of those two players. Second, to
maintain regional stability, Beijing's bottom line is that war on the Korean
peninsula and an abrupt collapse of the Kim Jong Il regime must be avoided at
all costs. Beijing has called on "all parties concerned to respond in a
cool-headed and appropriate manner and persist in seeking a peaceful solution
through consultation and dialogue."
Yet, Beijing's relatively passive,
noninterventionist diplomacy has not helped with its top priority: regional
stability, to which the continuing North Korean nuclear crisis poses a huge
threat.
More
Pressure Needed
Because Beijing has the most leverage on
Pyongyang, Beijing is facing great pressure from the international community,
particularly Washington and Tokyo. Some Western officials and scholars complain
that Beijing's cautious approach to Pyongyang has not constrained North Korea's
nuclear development. North Korea has proceeded with its nuclear tests and,
since April 14, has boycotted the six-party talks hosted by Beijing since 2003.
These actions have called into question Chinese leadership in the region.
Beijing is also facing great pressure on
the domestic front. The nuclear test has prompted a strong reaction from the
Chinese public. More and more Chinese citizens are angered by North Korea's
repeated escalation of the crisis and its imperviousness to Beijing's demands
for denuclearization. They believe that North Korea is doing great damage to
the peace of Northeast Asia, and many worry that Beijing could be dragged into
another Korean war by Pyongyang's rash actions.
According to some recent surveys in China,
more than two-thirds of respondents believe Beijing should take stronger
actions to constrain Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, including cutting economic
aid and applying UN sanctions. They consider North Korea a liability that, if
unchecked, will create trouble for China's economic and security interests.
Many Chinese believe that the concepts of North Korea as a buffer zone and the
"lips to China's teeth" are no longer relevant or salient. Beyond
concerns about a nuclear North Korea's impact on the stability of China's
security environment, they also worry that a nuclear North Korea would pose a
huge environmental threat to China's northeastern provinces. Much of the
Chinese public fears that an accident from a nuclear test or weapon would cause
heavy radioactive contamination in that region.
Recently, the Chinese media have begun to
criticize Pyongyang openly for its nuclear program. For instance, Global Times,
published by the government-run People's Daily newspaper, ran a June 3
editorial entitled "North Korea Should Not Offend the Chinese People."
The editorial said, "The Chinese people's impression of North Korea is at
the lowest level in history.... North Korea should understand that offending
the Chinese people is shaking and destroying the foundation of the bilateral
relationship. The changing attitude of the Chinese people toward North Korea
will surely affect the government's policy toward North Korea."
A majority of the public and many experts
in China have called on Beijing to adjust its policy on North Korea. Although
it may be difficult for Beijing to disregard this appeal, it can be expected
that Beijing's position toward Pyongyang will not change significantly in the
near future. If Beijing were to make any changes, it would take cautious and
gradual steps. Beijing may wish to retain close ties to Pyongyang in order to
gain more leverage over it. Also, although Beijing would be willing to
strengthen its relationship with other parties in negotiations over the nuclear
issue, it is not willing to take sides between Pyongyang and Washington.
China supports new, tightened UN sanctions
on North Korea for its nuclear test, but it has had to figure out its own
appropriate response to Pyongyang. Whether it acts through the United Nations
or on its own, Beijing has to strike a balance between being tough enough to
teach Pyongyang a lesson and not pushing Pyongyang toward an extreme reaction
or even regime collapse. At the same time, Beijing must also meet the demands
of Washington, Tokyo, and Seoul in pushing toward a denuclearized and stable
peninsula. This overall effort would be a big challenge to China's diplomatic
acuity and wisdom.
South Korea and Japan have affirmed that
they would not tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Thus, a similar affirmation by
China would push North Korea to think twice before continuing its nuclear
program. China should deliver a clear message to Pyongyang: nuclear weapons are
not in North Korea's long-term national security interest. Nuclear weapons will
generate increasing international pressure and economic sanctions that will
further devastate the already poor North Korean economy.
Beijing's control of energy aid to
Pyongyang could be crucial in pushing Pyongyang to denuclearize. Recent history
suggests that such an approach could be effective. China reportedly shut off an
oil pipeline to North Korea for three days in March 2003 due to "technical
difficulties." China's move was widely interpreted as an exercise of its
economic leverage to pressure Pyongyang to attend a trilateral meeting held in
Beijing in April 2003.
As it pushes Pyongyang, Beijing should
maintain its bottom line, which is to avoid war on the Korean peninsula and an
abrupt collapse of the Kim regime. One concern is that a U.S. military strike
on North Korea could spark a full-scale war that would inevitably harm China's
economic development. A U.S. strike could also force Beijing into an
embarrassing position because the 1961 Sino-Korean Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance obliges China to provide military aid to
North Korea in the event of war. Furthermore, the fall of the Kim government
could lead to sudden Korean unification and an uncertain geopolitical
realignment, including the prospect of U.S. troops at China's border.
Beijing should be able to adjust its
pressure on Pyongyang with a wide range of approaches, broadening its current
"pure carrot" approach to include curbs on oil supplies and other
exports. It is in Beijing's interests, however, to ensure that the pressure it
applies on North Korea is just a means toward denuclearization and not regime
change or collapse.
U.S.-Chinese
Coordination
Given that Washington holds what Pyongyang
covets most-diplomatic normalization and security guarantees-Beijing should
privately persuade Washington to engage in bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang
under the auspices of the six-party talks and put on the bargaining table a
reasonable offer in exchange for Pyongyang's denuclearization. Such an offer
should include robust security guarantees, normalization of relations, and
economic aid. Any resolution of the nuclear impasse has to address the
reasonable security concerns of North Korea. Pyongyang has often said that its
nuclear ambitions are driven solely by the U.S. military threat. Thus,
Pyongyang would most likely give up its nuclear program if it could get
reliable security assurances in addition to economic and political benefits.
Without Washington's cooperation, Pyongyang will undoubtedly continue to
escalate the crisis, and Beijing's influence on Pyongyang could be expected to
produce only limited success. Eventually, regardless of Pyongyang's intentions,
if Beijing and Washington cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington
must make a serious offer to the North Koreans. Then, Beijing can press
Pyongyang to accept such an offer by maximizing its leverage. This would be the
most feasible way toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.
It should be not difficult for Washington
to satisfy Pyongyang's needs. Washington should recognize the importance of
regime survival and the need for economic reform in North Korea. Given the long
history of mutual mistrust, Washington may not be sure about Pyongyang's real
strategic intentions, but the United States should take a chance by starting
serious talks with North Korea. Washington's offer should include normalization
and economic aid, including energy, following a principle of quid pro quo.
In practice, what North Korea could
potentially offer in a negotiation are pledges that, once implemented, are
difficult to reverse because they involve physical hardware or infrastructure.
Such steps include dismantling known facilities for plutonium production and
other processes relevant to a nuclear weapons program, surrendering all
plutonium produced in the past, and ending its uranium-enrichment and
long-range missile programs. Offers the United States could make, including
normalization and pledges of nonaggression and nonintervention, would be easier
to reverse if North Korea did not follow its commitment to nuclear disarmament.
Thus, any breakthroughs in the negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program
would likely have to start with Washington taking the first step.
It is possible that, as Pyongyang has
recently said, it will not accept any deal that requires it to give up its
nuclear program. If so, Beijing's control of aid to Pyongyang could be crucial
in pushing Pyongyang to make its final decision on denuclearization. Because
North Korea has very limited energy resources, long-term sustainable economic
advancement depends on Pyongyang opening its doors to the international
community, especially to foreign investment, trade, and aid from China, South
Korea, and Japan. South Korea and Japan have affirmed that they would not
tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Thus, an affirmation that Beijing would give no
support to a nuclear North Korea would force Pyongyang to think seriously about
its nuclear ambitions.
Finally, Beijing may show a greater
willingness to press Pyongyang if Washington also addresses China's concerns,
including U.S. missile defense and space weapons programs, U.S.-Japanese
missile defense cooperation, U.S. missile defense sales to Taiwan, and the
deployment of U.S. military forces in the Korean peninsula if the North Korean
regime collapses. Ultimately, if Washington can clearly demonstrate to Beijing
that its long-term strategic intentions in the region would not constrain
China, it could receive greater support from Beijing in negotiating with
Pyongyang. Some in China are concerned that once the North Korean nuclear issue
is resolved, Washington will focus its efforts on containing China. In
addition, some suspect that Washington really has no desire for North Korean
denuclearization and merely cares about the issue of nuclear transfer from
North Korea. They think a nuclear North Korea could provide a pretext for
Washington to strengthen its military ties with allies in the region, thereby
constraining China.
A
Denuclearization Road Map
Given the long history of mistrust and
animosity between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korean denuclearization will
not be achieved in one step. A road map is needed that links North Korean
denuclearization with the gradual delivery of concrete benefits, including
security assurances, diplomatic normalization, economic reform, and Northeast
Asian security cooperation. In practice, the joint statement of September 19,
2005, already provided the foundation for a "verifiable denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner," in which North Korea
committed to denuclearization in return for a set of security and economic
benefits. The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the
statement in a phased manner, "commitment for commitment, action for
action." The United States and North Korea have had very different
timelines, however, and the sequencing of actions for the denuclearization
process has not been well coordinated. North Korea and the United States are
wary of giving the other side something valuable at an early stage in the
process.
To address that obstacle, China should act
as a mediator and play a more proactive and constructive role by offering its
own road map for North Korean denuclearization. That detailed road map should
include a timetable and delineate the reciprocal actions each side should carry
out at certain stages. For each stage, the road map should clearly establish
what North Korea should pledge to do, what inspection and verification provisions
should be taken, and what benefits North Korea would receive regarding security
assurances and economic aid. To promote North Korean denuclearization, China
could play a number of active roles. For example, China, alone or together with
Russia, could provide North Korea with some kind of security guarantee to
reduce its security concerns. China could also help settle some of the disputes
between Pyongyang and Washington during the verification stages. In addition,
China could monitor and press both parties to implement faithfully their
pledges at each stage.
The following is a road map describing
three stages toward North Korean denuclearization: the first stage would focus
on refreezing and disabling plutonium production; the second stage would
involve dismantlement and decommissioning of all plutonium programs; and the
third stage would entail the dismantlement of the highly enriched uranium (HEU)
program. Each stage should be completed with adequate transparency and
verification measures. At the outset, the six parties would agree to a joint
statement of specific commitments under the road map. For example, North Korea
would commit to abandon all of its nuclear programs (plutonium and HEU
programs) and return to the NPT and to International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguards. North Korea would also pledge not to transfer any nuclear weapons,
fissile material, or knowledge during the implementation of the three stages.
The United States and others would pledge to respect Pyongyang's sovereignty,
normalize their diplomatic relations with North Korea, negotiate a peace treaty
on the Korean peninsula, and pursue a mechanism for Northeast Asian security
cooperation. The United States and other countries should also commit to
provide North Korea with economic cooperation and energy assistance, adding
specific pledges to the general principles articulated in the 2005 joint
statement.
First
Stage: As a first step to revive the six-party
talks quickly, the United States should commit to having direct bilateral talks
with North Korea for diplomatic normalization at an early stage under the
six-party talks. Meanwhile, China should press North Korea to return to the
six-party talks. All parties should reaffirm their commitment to the 2005 joint
statement and the 2007 agreement on disablement. While North Korea is disabling
its plutonium-production facilities and freezing its HEU program, the United
States and other parties should take reciprocal actions, including security
assurances and energy aid. The United States should affirm its commitment of
security assurances to North Korea by respecting Pyongyang's sovereignty, not
seeking a regime change, and formally stating it had no intention to attack or
invade. North Korea, South Korea, and the United States should negotiate a
trilateral peace treaty. The need for such a treaty is now particularly urgent
because North Korea has withdrawn from the 1953 armistice treaty that ended the
Korean War.
At that point in the road map, the United
States would begin to take steps to lift economic sanctions, establish a
liaison office, and assure economic cooperation between North and South Korea,
as well as between North Korea and Japan. All relevant parties would resume
energy aid to North Korea at the earliest possible time. To jump-start a new
round of the six-party talks, Washington would send a prominent figure-a former
president or other high-level official-to visit Pyongyang to help break the
ice.
Second
Stage: The second stage would include two phases to
dismantle North Korea's plutonium program. In the first phase, North Korea
would dismantle all of its plutonium-production facilities as a step toward a
long-term decommissioning program. To reciprocate Pyongyang's cooperation in
this phase, the United States and others would provide further security and
economic benefits, including the replacement of U.S. liaison offices with an
embassy and the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Meanwhile, Japan
would normalize its relations with North Korea after resolving the remaining
abductee issues. Finally, in order to get to full normalization with
Washington, Pyongyang would agree to a treaty ending its development of
long-range missiles and halting all exports of missiles and missile technology.
After Pyongyang and Washington established
normalized relations, Pyongyang would move quickly to the second phase:
dismantling its plutonium weapons and all facilities associated with the
weaponization program, as well as surrendering all of its plutonium.
It should be noted that the key to
denuclearizing North Korea is the timing of normalization. Although Washington
made an offer of normalization in the 2005 joint statement, it made the offer
subject to the two countries' "respective bilateral policies."
According to Washington, there will be a long road to normalizing relations
with Pyongyang. That road will include not only denuclearization, but also
discussions on human rights, biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missile
programs, conventional weapons proliferation, and terrorism and other illicit
activities. Pyongyang, however, wants normalization at a much earlier stage,
before dismantling its nuclear program.
North Korea will not dismantle its nuclear
program before receiving tangible security assurances, in particular,
normalized relations with Washington. The only leverage that Kim Jong Il
possesses is his threat to go nuclear. Therefore, Pyongyang fears that once it
dismantles its nuclear weapons, there will be no deterrent against a U.S.
military strike. Washington, however, as the world's pre-eminent military
superpower, would have considerable strategic flexibility. If the United States
provided North Korea with security assurances in return for denuclearization
and North Korea then reneged on its commitment, the United States would not
have lost much. Such a scenario could be frustrating and embarrassing for the
United States, but that country's security would not be at risk. In contrast,
if North Korea gave up its nuclear program and the United States later reneged
on its security assurances, perhaps even by supporting or participating in an
invasion, North Korea's very existence could be seen as being put at risk.
Third
Stage: In the last stage, North Korea would
complete dismantlement of its HEU program. The level of verification required
for the HEU program depends on the status of the program, such as whether or
not it has produced HEU. Its status could be somewhere between the research and
development level and pursuit of the capability to construct a pilot
experimental facility. If Pyongyang is only at the beginning of a
uranium-enrichment program, as it indicated June 13, North Korea could be years
away from producing enough HEU for one bomb.
Beyond denuclearization, North Korea would
also sign and implement the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
Weapons Convention. Furthermore, the United States, China, and other relevant
parties would negotiate a permanent peace regime in Northeast Asia. Such an
agreement would play a major role in liberating the Korean peninsula from its
Cold War quagmire and going to the root of the North Korean nuclear issue.
Pyongyang would need to cut its
conventional forces gradually to achieve parity with South Korean and U.S.
forces. That step would facilitate North Korean economic reform by
significantly reducing the economic burden on the country of maintaining such a
large military. Particularly valuable encouragement for North Korean force
reductions would come from the removal of U.S. troops from the South.
Furthermore, all other interested and involved parties would help the two
Koreas pursue gradual integration toward unification. During this third stage,
other countries would continue to aid North Korea's economic reform, help North
Korea improve human rights, and provide funds and technologies for the
modernization of its economic infrastructure.
Conclusion
A nuclear North Korea would put China's
national interests at great risk. Beijing can increase pressure on Pyongyang,
using positive inducements and punitive measures. The chances are low, however,
that Beijing will radically adjust its North Korea policy, at least for the
near future. Beijing will continue to maintain its bottom-line approach,
avoiding war on the Korean peninsula and an abrupt collapse of the Kim regime.
From China's perspective, these scenarios must be avoided at all costs because
they are contrary to China's primary interest in a stable environment.
Given that Washington holds what Pyongyang
desires most (security guarantees), Beijing should persuade Washington to
engage in bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang. China should push the United
States to put reasonable offers on the bargaining table, including robust
security guarantees, normalization of relations, and economic aid. At that
point, China could maximize its leverage and press North Korea to accept the
terms offered. This strategy may be the only way to roll back Pyongyang's
nuclear ambitions.
This strategy may not work. Pyongyang may
decide not to give up its nuclear program for any sort of deal. Yet, if all of
North Korea's neighbors, including China and the United States, make it clear
that they will never tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea and that
international isolation therefore will inexorably continue, Pyongyang may
decide to give up its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang will not yield to a purely
"stick" approach, however, and eventually a desperate and nuclear
North Korea may take actions that are in no one's interests.
To achieve a stable and denuclearized
Korean peninsula, all parties concerned must come back to the negotiating
table. In particular, Beijing must press Pyongyang to return to the six-party
talks as soon as possible. Given that Washington and Pyongyang deeply mistrust
each other and neither side wants to go first, China, as a mediator, should
play a more proactive and constructive role by offering its own road map for
North Korean denuclearization. The six-party talks espoused a general principle
of "commitment for commitment, action for action" as a means to
denuclearization, but there were no specific timelines or sequencing of actions
in the denuclearization process.
The three-stage road map detailed above
should fill this gap and satisfy the principal goals of all the parties
involved. Pressing for a road map is a step that holds few risks for China and
could contribute greatly to resolving the long-standing international stalemate
with North Korea. That success, in turn, would help China achieve its chief
priority: a stable and a denuclearized Korean peninsula.
t; app9 � h ( Y and eventually a desperate and nuclear
North Korea may take actions that are in no one's interests.
To achieve a stable and denuclearized
Korean peninsula, all parties concerned must come back to the negotiating
table. In particular, Beijing must press Pyongyang to return to the six-party
talks as soon as possible. Given that Washington and Pyongyang deeply mistrust
each other and neither side wants to go first, China, as a mediator, should
play a more proactive and constructive role by offering its own road map for
North Korean denuclearization. The six-party talks espoused a general principle
of "commitment for commitment, action for action" as a means to
denuclearization, but there were no specific timelines or sequencing of actions
in the denuclearization process.
The three-stage road map detailed above
should fill this gap and satisfy the principal goals of all the parties
involved. Pressing for a road map is a step that holds few risks for China and
could contribute greatly to resolving the long-standing international stalemate
with North Korea. That success, in turn, would help China achieve its chief
priority: a stable and a denuclearized Korean peninsula.
